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This article explores the relation between literature as a form of artistic understanding and pragmatism as 
a form of philosophical inquiry.  It does so, first, by exploring the place that each similarly accords the 
imagination as an instrument both of knowing and of making.   The American philosopher John Dewey 
expressed the nature of this linkage when he argued that the purpose of art – and, he could have added, of 
pragmatic reflection as well – is to contrast actual conditions and their probable consequences with the 
purely plausible outcomes of experiences that are merely potential. Second, it shows how the cognitive 
needs served in this way by both literature and pragmatic philosophy converge around a double truth.   
Just as we need forms to express and experience what would otherwise go unsaid and thus unfelt and 
unknown, so we also need forms that also help us retrieve what we have already experienced or 
understood but have then either forgotten or suppressed.  Literary and philosophical forms serve both 
these functions by at once taking us out of ourselves to experience what is strange and foreign on the 
peripheries of our understanding and also return us to the center of our experience where we so often 
recover a sense of the strangeness and foreignness that is already within it.  Third, this article discusses 
how these strategies have found expression in a tradition of American writing that begins with Emerson 
and continues down the present and is marked by a special kind of linguistic skepticism.  
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The question that composes my title is intended to be a provocative. I want to see if I 
can dislodge some common assumptions both about pragmatism and about literature. 
I want to do this by an argument that has three loosely interrelated parts. The first 
takes up the issue of what, despite appearances, philosophical pragmatism and fictive 
forms have in common as methods of inquiry, modes of understanding. The second 
moves on to consider what sorts of cognitive needs they serve and how they satisfy 
them. The third then turns on how pragmatism has found expression in American 
writing and the ways it can be read. These various steps won’t bring us to a single 
definition of what a pragmatist approach to literature might look like but it will, I 
hope, trouble those who might otherwise believe that this is merely an exercise in 
comparing apples and oranges. 
When most of us use the word ‘pragmatism,’ we rarely have in mind anything that 
could be associated with the world of the arts. For most people, pragmatism refers to 
an attitude toward reality, an approach to problem-solving, which is practical, matter-
of-fact, hard-nosed, and results-oriented. The arts, on the other hand, are typically 
conceived of as imaginative, speculative, playful, and open-ended. Even if we know 
that as a philosophical perspective and method, pragmatism was developed by 
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William James as a technique for resolving the otherwise interminable disputes 
between philosophers and other thinkers who were always getting hung up over first 
principles, apriori reasons, and fixed categories, we probably don’t know that it was 
always intended to be an intellectual instrument that accords a significant place to the 
imagination.  
Adapting some ideas of his colleague Charles Saunders Pierce, James defined 
pragmatism a theory of inquiry that included a particular conception of truth and a 
specific method for determining it. As for the method, James proposed that the 
meaning of any proposition was not necessarily confined to some particular to which 
it was alleged to directly point but should be expanded to include what within 
experience would have to change it if were held to be true. As to the theory, James 
argued that it would make better sense to think of the true less as some inherent 
property of ideas, such as their correspondence with reality, than as a feature of their 
working relationship with other parts of our experience.  
In this slightly wooden epistemological formula, James was intending to offer a 
simple, common-sense rule for determining what beliefs actually amount to and how 
they become verified, but he actually accomplished a good deal more than this. In two 
bold strokes, James had taken epistemological operations out of the hands of the 
abstractly rational or the empirically measurable and recast them as more of an art 
than a science in which the ‘inferential’ and the ‘possible’ play at least as a significant 
a role in most forms of reflection as the ‘practicable’ or the ‘verifiable.’  
But how did he do this? How did James put the imagination back into a 
philosophical approach designed to shift the determination of the meaning and truth 
of ideas away from initial presuppositions, deductive reasoning, and closed arguments 
toward outcomes, consequences, and implications without simply reducing them 
crudely to their effects, to the differences they make? The answer is that if James 
associated the meaning of ideas in part, but only in part, with would have to change if 
they were true, he also realized that many of these supposed outcomes and 
consequences cannot be verified or corroborated before we must act on them. Hence 
he concluded that we act in general not on the basis of assured facts or validated 
predictions but on the basis of surmises, conjectures, and speculations. Thinking for 
James was something like “constructing an image of the environment, running the 
model faster than the environment, and then predicting that the environment will 
behave as the model does” (E. Egalanter and M. Gerstenhaber, quoted in Geertz 1973: 
78). Thus for James the imagination assumes a role in the operations of the intellect 
that is far from accidental or merely secondary, since so much of the life of the mind 
is devoted to determinations whose results we can never substantiate in advance but 
can only guess at or gamble on before we have to respond to them.  
John Dewey, James’s philosophical ally, then took this same belief in the 
imaginative dimension of all epistemological operations one step further by 
identifying the intellectual, by which Dewey meant the critical, with a double 
movement that operates aesthetically in two directions at the same time. While one of 
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the aesthetic movements of critical reflection inevitably carries inquiry back into the 
past to determine the probable, as opposed to demonstrable, conditions from which 
something presumably emerges, the second inevitably carries inquiry forward by 
trying to figure out the potential, as opposed to the unequivocally predictable or 
assured, results in which something may issue. 
But Dewey didn’t stop there. Indeed, his investigations into the place of the 
aesthetic in all acts of intellectual reflection convinced him that the aesthetic is not 
merely one category among others but, in fact, the potential form and destiny of every 
experience, the most basic category of all. Dewey had already stated as early as 1920 
that philosophy needs to relinquish the search for an absolute and immutable reality 
and replace it with the effort to enhance all experience by exploring its possibilities 
for richer and more extensive fulfilment. This conviction eventually led him to 
reconceive experience itself as a form of art--as something that moves through 
resistances toward richer integrations--and then to reformulate the purpose of art as 
the continuous revaluation and augmentation of life itself. But by this time Dewey 
was also prepared assert that art is more moral than moralities. Moralities, he argued, 
merely consecrate the status quo, reinforce the established order. Art, by contrast, 
challenges the status quo and destabilizes the establish order by “keeping alive the 
sense of purposes that outrun evidence and of meanings that transcend [petrified] 
habit.” (Dewey [1934] 1980: 348). In other words, the moral function of art was for 
Dewey identical with its critical function: “to remove prejudice, do away with the 
scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils of want and custom, perfect 
the power to perceive” (Dewey [1934] 1980: 325). 
So much, then, for pragmatism’s supposed indifference to art, its presumed 
incompatibility with fictive forms. But we can go further than this. Both literature and 
pragmatism seem to rely on the relation between the actual and the imagined, between 
the assumed or known and the possible, for whatever cognitive insights they can 
provide in the first place. Dewey put it best when he argued that the purpose of art is 
nothing less than to contrast actual conditions and their probable consequences with 
the purely plausible outcomes of experiences that are merely potential. But why do 
we do we need to submit to this exercise, you might ask? Because, as Dewey wrote, 
“it is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that we become aware of con-
strictions that hem us in and of burdens that oppress” (Dewey [1934] 1980: 346). So, 
literature and the other arts, we could say, serve important cognitive needs, 
particularly since these needs typically deal with elements of experience, with 
dimensions of life and understanding, that are often hidden from view and therefore 
difficult to detect. But what, more specifically, are these elements and dimensions, 
and how does, or may, a pragmatist approach to literature help bring them into focus?  
Let’s begin with the fact that, on the one hand, human beings, can never express or 
communicate everything they know, or feel, or want to share. The problem isn't 
simply that people are naturally defensive, or indifferent, or evasive (though I suspect 
that all of us are all of these thing at least some of the time), but rather that the 
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motives, the reasons, the necessities for expression are often far more plentiful, often 
more problematic, than the opportunities for it. We all need to talk and be talked to, to 
tell our stories about the trip to the grocery, the date with our new heartthrob, the truth 
about the Economic Recession of 2008, but our society can never adequately provide 
us with sufficient opportunity for such conversations for any number of reasons: 
because the saying of it would expose us to contempt, hostility, danger, incrimination, 
or embarrassment; or because the persons with whom we would and must speak are, 
like dead relatives, absent friends, estranged lovers, singing nightingales, or divine 
beings inaccessible to us; or because what we have to say is too complicated, subtle, 
elusive, ambiguous, or offensive for any social exchange to accommodate. 
Consequently, there are always sentiments we would like to express, knowledge 
we could acquire, ways we might wish to speak, but for the fact that there are either 
no suitable occasions on which to do so, or no acceptable audiences to hear it, or no 
style or idiom or terms in which to say it. What literary texts, like other fictive forms, 
do is to create such occasions, to define such audiences, to develop such necessary 
styles. The poem, the novel, the play, the essay furnishes us with a situation where 
conversations with lovers, or with God, or with the dead, or with flowers, can and, in 
effect, do occur, but they occur obliquely, circuitously, sometimes deviously. Since 
the writer can’t bring the dead back to life, or make God visible, or restore the 
beloved to the lover, she must instead invent or re-present situations where lovers, 
God, or the dead, can speak and be responded to, can be interacted with. Thus the 
writer seeks to tell “all the truth,” as the America poet Emily Dickinson once said, but 
must “tell it slant.” 
Works of art, stories, tales, narratives serve our practical cognitive needs, that is, 
help us know things we need to know, by providing us with new expressive powers, 
by allowing us to speak, as it were, the otherwise unspeakable. But works of art and 
literature also serve our additional practical need, again cognitive, to recover and 
recognize what, in truth, we may have already partially experienced but then have 
either forgotten or for some reason suppressed. This forgetting and suppressing and, 
to use the psychoanalytic word, repressing occurs all the time because each of us is 
the subject of far more experiences than we can possibly absorb, much less assimilate. 
Given the practical demands on ordinary perception, we simply cannot give equal 
attention to all the things that impinge on us either from the external world or from 
the world of our own conscious and unconscious. In truth, our ordinary perceptions 
are so fully focused on--and so fully delimited by--the demands of the immediate 
situation that we rarely succeed in remembering for very long any experiences but 
those that serve our most obvious and immediate cognitive needs. As a result, much 
that happens to us, and thus that is potentially knowable by us, slips by seemingly 
unknown or in any case unacknowledged.  
Hence, again, our practical need for some instrumentality, some mechanism, that 
will allow us to retrieve such forgotten or suppressed experiences so that we don’t 
lose them altogether. This is the second thing that narratives, stories, literary texts are 
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designed in part to do: to help us remember what very often we didn’t even know we 
knew –“a perception never before quite articulated, an emotion we had sustained on 
the periphery of consciousness, a sense, barely grasped, of the import of some 
incident”1 (Smith 1978: 145). Narratives, lyrics, dramas, and other forms help us not 
only hold on to these experiences but actually recover them by constructing textual 
situations or contexts which present us with some new reasons to attend to them and 
take them seriously. 
So let us review for a moment. One of the practical cognitive needs that narratives, 
stories, and tales, like music, visual art, film, and the built environments, all serve is 
provide opportunities to imagine the inconceivable, think the unthinkable, say the 
unsayable, hear the unhearable, feel the unfeelable. At the same time, they also help 
us to recover parts of our experience that we would otherwise have lost. In this sense, 
they not only take us out of ourselves to experience foreign territories of experience 
but they also return us to ourselves to recover the sense of the strangenesses we did 
not know we knew.  
But works of art also deal with elements of life that are sometimes painful and 
ambiguous and sometimes threatening as well as fascinating, so how do they capture 
and hold our attention? What is it about them as forms of experience that permits 
them to override our usual impatience with complexity and our usual intolerance of 
discomfort? One reason is our interest in suspense. We like to see how things turn out, 
even if the things themselves are not very interesting to us. So we refuse to switch 
channels to leave a very dull or stupid program on television if our curiosity about its 
outcome is aroused. This is part of our desire for closure, for completion, for 
resolution, that goes very deep in all of us and that most of us can’t live without a 
sense of for very long. 
The second reason that we are compelled to take certain works of literature 
seriously has to do with their relation to feeling. They arouse and stimulate feelings, 
to be sure, but they also operate of means of feeling. As William Butler Yeats once 
put it, works of art do their thinking “in the mire and fury of human veins.” Far from 
merely evoking emotion in the reader, which is true in itself and no doubt likewise 
valuable, narratives and the other arts also embody in themselves models, paradigms, 
images of what for their audiences feeling or affect actually is. That is, they represent 
forms by which to feel with when the truth of experience is not a matter of meanings 
and ideas but of senses, intimations, intuitions, divinations, suppositions, 
superstitions. Hence Marcel Proust’s claim that certain truths can only be examined 
and expressed in the form of stories.  
Third and finally, fictive forms hold our attention, even when they force us to 
confront disquieting realities and truths, because they are constructed like ‘as-if’ 
statements, or what in philosophy are called ‘conditional contrary-to-fact statements.’ 
__________ 
 
1 For Smith’s entire discussion of the cognitive needs theory, see Smith (1978: 145-46). 
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That is, artistic forms, and the actions or events they represent, are structured not as 
logics of probability but as logics of plausibility; what they ask us to entertain is not 
that the situations they develop within their confines might happen but could happen. 
In other words, works of art invite us to grant them their initial assumptions, 
assumptions we can all accept as either more or less ‘givens’ in life or potential to it – 
in Shakespeare’s King Lear, that all fathers want a measure of gratitude from their 
children; in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom's Cabin, that all mothers want to 
keep their families together; in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, that all 
lovers deserve to be reunited and all children deserve to be acknowledged by their 
parents; in Herman Melville’s novel Moby-Dick, that cosmic injustice has to be 
answered for – and then proceed to show where, under certain selected conditions, 
those assumptions can lead.  
Works of art are thus suppositional or conjectural structures, structures we can 
attend to even when they disturb us because they are designed to tell us not what did, 
or always does, or inevitably must, happen in life, but rather what could happen if life 
were shaped as perfectly by forms and styles of feeling as Don Quixote or 
Remembrance of Time’s Past. What the work of art takes from life are not its 
conclusions but rather the terms and substance of its original premise. It then selects, 
organizes, and motivates that premise – all father’s want gratitude from their children, 
all mothers want to keep their families together, etc. – In a such a way as to produce a 
purely hypothetical set of events that are not given at all but that nonetheless follow 
credibly from it as a series of potentialities inherent in a set of actualities.  
Works of art are thus constructed more like laboratory experiments than like 
philosophical arguments; that is, they are like hypotheses in need of validation, not 
like propositions in need of verification. And from this it follows that the purpose of 
art is less to confirm or interpret the known than to explore unknown, to induce us to 
think that something else might be, or at least could be, the case. To put this another 
way, it is “to enable us to think and feel otherwise than as we do. It is to erect a larger 
context of experience within which we may define and understand our own by 
attending to the disparity between it and the experience of others” (Cunningham 
1960: 141). 
In this conception, then, the heuristic or educational value of the aesthetic is 
closely associated with its pragmatics, and its pragmatics are both critical and 
emancipatory. Aesthetic texts are critical because they seem to emerge at that point 
where, as Hayden White once put it, “our apprehension of the world outstrips our 
capacities for comprehending it, or, conversely, where canonized modes of 
comprehension have closed off our capacities for new experience.” Those we at least 
tend to value most highly seem to breach, to return to White, “the conventional 
hierarchies of significance in which experience is presently ordered” and to project a 
new imagination or sense of things “which previously existed only as a perceptual 
possibility” (White 1970: 179-80). On the other hand, imaginative texts are 
potentially emancipatory just insofar as the contrast they probe, or at any rate 
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presuppose, between the actual and the potential leads to an extension, however 
minimal, of our sense of the knowable. To read them this way is to read them 
‘pragmatically’ – in relation to the act of a mind as it feels, as much as thinks, its way 
through words toward the circumstances of their affective significance in 
consciousness.  
This is the way reading was taught, Richard Poirier argued, in a famous under-
graduate course at Harvard in the mid-fifties and early sixties known as ‘Hum 6,’ a 
course that took its inspiration from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous declaration that 
“the poet uses forms according to the life, and not according to the form.” Emerson’s 
statement has frequently been taken to license a vaporous, diffuse, unstructured 
subjectivity of which Emerson himself has often been held to be guilty, but Poirier 
believes that this statement repositions Emerson as the source of a tradition of literary 
and intellectual pragmatism in American writing that constitutes an alternative to the 
conventional view of modernism and casts modernism's relation to postmodernism in 
an entirely different light. Defining a group of writers originating with Emerson and 
including Whitman, the James brothers, Frost, Stein, and Stevens, while conceding a 
place as well to a host of other writers from Thoreau, Dickinson, Pound, and Dewey 
to William Carlos Williams, Kenneth Burke, John Ashbery, and A. R. Ammons, this 
was, and is, a tradition held together chiefly by its aversion to absolutes and foun-
dationalism, its fascination with contingency, process, and change, its respect for the 
commonplace and the ordinary, its belief in the constructed nature of truth, and its 
emphasis on the relational dimensions of the real.  
This is a tradition has expressed itself typically in one of two ways or modes. The 
first might be thought of as ‘comic’ because it exhibits a wary but often bemused, if 
not humorous, skepticism toward anything that can be identified with what the 
sociologist Peter Berger once called “the noise of solemn assemblies.” Assuming that 
in an economy of moral and intellectual scarcity cultural forms will always rush in to 
fill the vacuum by encouraging the development of a certain moral pretentiousness, 
what Kenneth Burke would describe as an attitude of ‘Holier than Thou,’ the comic or 
vernacular strain in American pragmatism typically attempts to resist the pull of 
cultural pieties by rhetorically negotiating a kind of transcendence downward in order 
to restore what, in Armies of the Night, Norman Mailer described as “the hard edge of 
proportion to the overblown values that otherwise threaten to engulf each small 
military existence.” (1968: 47). In its antic or playful dimensions, then, this 
pragmatist tradition of writing tends to view “the world's rich store of error as a 
genuine aspect of truth,” to quote Kenneth Burke, and therefore urges us, to continue 
with Burke, because “the troublous genius of symbolism,” is always tempting us to 
misjudge and inflate reality, to spy on ourselves with “pious yet sportive fearfulness” 
Rueckert (1982: 161). 
In its more elevated or at least less antic form, on the other hand, this same 
pragmatic tradition has found its own richest intensifications by exploring moments 
when the ordinary becomes exceptional, the familiar strange, the habitual other 
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without at the same time being made available either to the reductionisms or to the 
bloatings of ideology. These are moments when the actual is rendered extraordinary, 
the prosaic mysterious, the commonplace sublime because it is imagined “as if it were 
not less but, because extemporized within and also against existent forms, immea-
surably more than the result of some ‘arrangements of knowledge.’” (Poirier 1987: 
202). Here rhetoric seeks not to deflate, subvert, exaggerate, or ridicule the subjects of 
its discourse but to submit the tropological behavior of language itself to the energies 
of its own verbal technologies. In the moment when punning, joking, and troping 
break the grip of institutionalized terminologies, a kind of self-emancipation is 
effected merely by the way the writing calls attention to the performative presence of 
a self even in gestures of its own dissolution or self-effacement.  
Poirier was at first tempted to call this literary practice of pragmatist self-erasure a 
kind of ‘writing off the self’ (Poirier 1987: 181-223). But he later reconceived it as a 
self-conscious linguistic skepticism, where the arrow of sense released by the 
deconstructive mechanisms within language itself actually enable language to point 
beyond skepticism, toward possibilities for personal and cultural renewal. To follow 
this movement within language beyond language requires, it is necessary, Poirier 
insisted, to think differently about words and the things that can be done with them. 
Where the conventional way of thinking about such matters associates words with 
things, language with reference, and verbal signs with substantives, Emerson, 
anticipating the nomenclature that William James would later employ to give this 
linguistic skepticism its first American philosophical elaboration, was convinced that 
words have more to do with actions and events, language with processes and power, 
verbal signs with transitives and connectives.  
James formulated this possibility most simply when he said somewhere that what 
“[verbal] formulas express leaves unexpressed almost everything that they organically 
divine and feel.” It is this element of the ‘unexpressed’ and the verbally inexpressible-
-what James simply called “the vague” and its cognate “the superfluous” – that a 
pragmatic perspective brings back into criticism, just as James before him wanted to 
reinstate it in philosophy. Vagueness is an interpretive consequence of that excess of 
intelligibility that accompanies every act of perception, a “Sense of the More,” as 
James described it, attendant upon all acts of understanding and constitutes the 
remainder that is always left over when we try to calculate the interpretive sum, so to 
speak, yielded by such acts. Vagueness, ambiguity, even undecidability, derive from 
the failures that language continuously experiences in its effort to represent its own 
understanding in words. But this failure is quickening as well as salutary. The words 
are there to point to, or, better, lead toward insights, intuitions, intimations that would 
be lost if in fact they were named.  
Here, then, is where the pragmatic approach to literature is, or can be, particularly 
illuminating. By showing how purposes in literary texts, indeed all works of art, often 
outrun evidence and meanings transcend reference, it not only reveals how such texts 
imaginatively work but helps account for the sources of their spell. 
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